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This paper is divided into three parts: the first describes church leadership's 
relationship with ethics; the second highlights some initiatives by 
examining some principles, policies and pledges that are being proposed; 
and the third turns to moral rights and their relevance for the life of the 
church. 
I. Church Leadership and Ethics 
If the past five years of the sexual abuse crisis has taught us 
anything, it is that ethics had very little to do with it. 
Ethics was not only lacking among the predatory priests, but it 
was also noticeably absent in the decision-making by bishops and their 
counselors as they transferred such priests, as they failed to notify civil 
authorities, as they stonewalled and defamed the reputations of 
concerned and aggrieved parents, and as they left children at profound 
risk. But ethics was also not evident even after the harm was done. As 
the crisis unfolded, innocent priests were not protected, due process 
was often and still remains breached, financial mismanagement has 
frequently occurred, lay initiatives were created with scorn, derision, 
and suspicion, priests _who protested Episcopal mismanagement 
became targeted, and chanceries relied on certain types of lawyers who 
did little to promote the common good. 
Why was ethics so absent? Why didn't anyone in clerical or 
Episcopal life ask the simple question, "is this ethical?" Why was such a 
relevant question not evidently invoked? It is not just that these years 
teach us that things have been rough in church life, it is also true that 
there were few indications that someone in leadership wanted to 
determine what the ethical course of action would be. Instead, as Paul 
Lakeland recently writes about the church: "it has created a 
professional class, self-perpetuating and self-policing, insulated from 
the people by lifestyle and the possession of all executive and legislative 
authority." Let me add that that insularity is also from any internal 
discourse of ethics. 1 
' Paul Lakeland, "Understanding the Crisis in the Church," Jean Bartunek, Mary Ann Hinsdale, 
and James Keenan, ed., Church Ethics and its Organizational Context (Lanham, Md.: Sheed 
and Ward, 2005) 3- 15, at 14. 
We need to realize chat ecclesiastical leadership does not 
regularly promote for their own members an awareness of the ethical 
goods and benefits chat are engaged by the practice of critical ethical 
thinking in routine decision-making. 
Unlike many other professions, religious leaders rarely turn to 
ethical norms to consider what constitutes right conduct in their field 
of leadership and service. I do not mean by this chat religious leaders 
or their decisions are always unethical. Rather, I mean chat when 
religious, clergy and bishops exercise routine decision-making they turn 
to a mulcitude of considerations, but articulated ethical norms, their 
specific values and goods, the virtues and the type of critical chinking 
chat estimates the long-standing social claims chat these values, goods 
and virtues have on us, are not explicitly, professionally engaged. In a 
word, ethical norms and critical ethical reasoning, which frequently aid 
other professionals in law, business, medicine, counseling, nursing, and 
even policies, play a much less explicit role in ecclesial leadership 
practices. 
But before I go further, let me be clear about a number of 
presuppositions with which I am operating chat I need to make clear. I 
will simply stipulate six of these chat I have developed elsewhere. 2 
First, what I say about the Roman Catholic Church applies to 
ocher communities of faith. Many churches simply do not default to 
an explicitly ethical way of chinking in making leadership decisions. 
Second, I am not solely concerned with sexual boundaries, but 
also with financial responsibility, personal and social accountability, the 
claims of confidentiality, the importance of truth-celling, due process, 
consulcacion, contracts, fair wages, delations, adequate representation, 
appeals, conflicts of interests, etc. 
Third, chis is not part of an ideological agenda, neither 
progressive or conservative. I am simply proposing chat such training 
in ethical reflection is necessary for those who exercise the various 
ministries of the Church. 
' James F. Keenan, "Toward an Ecclesial Professional Ethics," Ibid., 83-96. 
2 
Fourth, the lack of training in ethics has caused a greater 
vacuum than most laity recognize. The laity, I believe, presume chat we 
have attended to this training all along and that we routinely engage in 
professional ethical standards. Thus for the most part, in the wake of 
the scandal the laity has rightfully insisted on talking about structures 
of governance without focusing on the related questions of ethics. 
Fifth, this lack of critical ethical training is evident not only in 
ministerial decisions but, also in the practices internal to the clerical, 
religious and Episcopal culcures. 
Finally, I believe chat mandating ethical training and 
subsequent ethical accountability ought not to be seen as inimical to 
the interests of the church or her mission, but rather constitutive of it, 
as Yale University's Wayne Meeks notes in The Origins of Christian 
Morality: The First Two Centuries: "Making morals means making 
community."3 
So, why is there so little ethical professional insight within the 
leadership practices and lives of our clergy and episcopacy? I offer two 
answers. 
The more immediate answer is that seminarians, religious men 
and women, lay leaders, and bishops are not and have not been trained 
in professional ethics. Those who study at seminaries, divinity schools, 
or schools of theology, rarely receive the type of ethical training that 
chose at most other professional schools receive. Persons admitted to 
business, medical, or law schools take ethics courses that address 
specifically the ethical issues that are relevant to their particular 
profession. Those students are taught the responsibilities and rights 
specific to their profession, whether these deal with matters of 
representation, confidentiality, client expectations, privileges, 
promotions, evaluations, conflicts of interest, professional boundaries, 
etc. Their ethics courses in their professional schools aim to shape, if 
not the students' internal dispositions, then at least the students' 
external conduct so as to become acceptable colleagues in their 
particular professional field. Subsequent to this education, they join 
'Wayne Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) 5. 
3 
professional organizations which establish minimal codes of ethical 
conduct for their members. They become part of accountability 
structures from internal reviews to the Internal Revenue. 
This type of professional ethical training and accountability is 
generally not found at most seminaries, divinity schools or schools of 
theology, even though many students take two, three or four courses of 
Christian ethics. What we find, instead, are courses that deal with the 
sexual lives of the laity, the social ethics of businesses, and the medical 
ethics of physicians and nurses. That is, those in ministry are taught 
how co govern and make morally accountable the members of their 
congregations with regard co their sexual, reproductive, and marital 
lives as well as being able co make claims about those in the medical 
and business profession. But generally speaking they are not taught by 
what ethical reasoning, insights, or norms, they should be held morally 
accountable as pastors, priests, or bishops. They have no training on 
the keeping of confidences, on making assignments, on professional 
evaluations, on the relevance of truth-telling, on crisis management, etc. 
In the hierarchical structure in which priests exist, their 
accountability is solely to "the man upstairs." That is, a priest's or 
bishop's professional accountability is singularly vertical, but again that 
man upstairs has probably had no training in fairness or any other 
professional ethical standard. Thus a priest basically is singularly 
responsible to nothing but the bishop's own expectations and 
judgments. Quite apart from the absence of any ethical standards 
guiding the bishop's evaluation of his priests, religious and lay 
ministers, there do not seem co be any specific normative standards co 
guide the bishop in his assessment of his diocesan personnel. Moreover, 
this vertical accountability is singularly unidirectional. 
Furthermore, there is very little horizontal accountability in 
this very clerical world. A priest is not accountable either to a fellow 
priest, his community, or even co his parish. This is the world of 
clerical culture, that Michael Papesh tragically captures in his work, 
Clerical Culture: Contradiction and Transformation.4 
4 Michael Papesh, C lerical Culture: Contradiction and Transformation (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 2004) . 
-
4 
It is worth noting, that there is one other institutional culture 
that also fails co make professional ethics a part of their mode of 
proceeding and that is, the academy. Like the clerical world, we 
professors teach ethics for others, but we have not been trained in it. 
None of us are really trained to be ethical in the standards we use for 
grading papers, for seeing students, for maintaining office hours, for 
evaluating colleagues or prospective hires. We have not been taught 
anything about professional boundaries with our students or about 
keeping our contracts. We have not really addressed the fact that our 
salaries are so disproportionate or that tenure decisions sometimes lack, 
what shall we call it, "objectivity". We do not have professional 
questions about our investments, our budgets, or about our boards of 
directors. Our accountability is solely vertical, co our chairs and deans, 
but not co one another and certainly not to our students. 
Like the church, our standards are fairly medieval and the 
standards of horizontal professional accountability noticeably mute. 
At Boston College, the wonderful university where I teach, we 
have an enormously successful program entitled, the Church of the 
Twenty-First Century (or Church 21) wherein we have had hundreds 
of speakers, papers, and events envisioning the Church as alive, 
accountable and transparent. Echoing my colleague Frank Clooney I 
also want a program entitled the University of the 21st century ... 
Wouldn't that be an interesting idea! 
But let me return to the church. 
Another reason why there has not been any ethical training in 
church leadership actually goes back to the Enlightenment. After the 
wars of Religion, the Enlightenment attempted co establish a way of 
understanding the ethical as universally normative. While the Church 
was teaching as it had about matters pertaining co the seven deadly sins 
and the ten commandments, and after the Church had validated in the 
seventeenth century the triple contract and allowed for money lending, 
pensions, annuities, banks, pawn shops and a host of other financial 
innovations, it unleashed an industrialized world that needed moral 
guidance beyond what pertained co sin and what did not. The 
Enlightenment's engagement of reasoned argumentation in the 
5 
eighteenth century left it freer than the Church whose tradition needed 
a constant casuistry in order to advance. The Enlightenment moved in 
where the Church once was. Adam Smith's Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, for instance, provided a moral outline about how to 
proceed in the new markets of emerging democracies. Moreover, its 
democratic interests in horizontal accountability offered a new model 
of moral uprightness. In fact, we know how strongly the church 
resisted those democratic movements preferring the palace to the 
senate. It became a foreigner in the democratic world where normative 
standards were being articulated by lay judges rather than by clerical 
confessors. In a way the Confessional remained the place for personal 
sin, but social guidelines were less and less regulated by church dicta. 
Eventually, in the name of civil religion, the Enlightenment raised up 
the legislative conscience seeking to regulate as normative human 
commerce. Later on, in this past century the term professional ethics 
would enter a variety of mainline professions and their respective 
teaching institutions as well. But one place those standards never 
entered was the world of the Church where the moral was once 
singularly determined by the theologian but now by the bishop and 
mediated by the priest confessor in a highly vertical, unidirectional 
hierarchical accountability structure. 
Today we see the church wrestling with those democratic 
structures of governance. We see the church in court, bishops being 
deposed, priests being arrested, affidavits being filed, audits being run. 
A new mode of accountability is being imposed on the Church. But 
this is an imposition from outside invoking minimalist standards that 
many local churches failed to observe. 
Do church leaders need to be so passive in this ordeal? Could 
not Church leadership take a more aggressive stance and become not 
only regulated, but also self-regulating, ethically self-regulating? Could 
not the Church put up its own standards, that are not only 
professionally ethically responsible but also have a form of transparent 
accountability that is predominantly horizontal? Could not these 
standards also be articulated and imposed from within? I believe so. 
Toward that end, I turn now to contemporary proposals for 
reform which point us in a variety of directions. These heuristic guides 
-
6 
show us how fertile the theological imagination is as well as the wide 
range of resources available. They also highlight that the field of ethics 
for the life of the church could be as expansive as similar fields like 
medical or social ethics. To highlight this spectrum, I cite three essays: 
one which invokes corporate ethical principles for crisis management, 
another which seeks to restore church policies that promote more 
horizontal accountability, and, a third which offers a set of pledges 
appropriate for church leadership. 
II. Principles, Policies, and Pledges 
Last year, I wrote a lengthy bibliographical essay, entitled 
"Ethics and the Crisis in the Church," in Theological Studies referring 
to more than a hundred and forty books and essays on the topic of 
church ethics. The writers included journalists like The Times' Peter 
Steinfels, NCR's John Allen, and The Tablet's Elena Curci, canonists 
like John Beal, historians like John O'Malley and James O'Toole, 
sociologists like Dean Hoge, Patricia Chang, and Katarina Schuch, 
priests like Michael Papesh and Donald Cozzens, theologians like Paul 
Lakeland, Frank Sullivan, and Cardinal Avery Dulles, moral 
theologians like Lisa Sowle Cahill, Stephen Pope, Anne Patrick, and 
Richard Gula, lay leaders like VOTF's Jim Post and Fadica's Frank 
Buder, political scientists like Mary Jo Bane and Bruce Russet, business 
scholars like Kim Eisbach, and Denise Rousseau.5 
Let me consider three of these. First, from Thomas Plante's Sin 
Against the Innocents there is Kirk Hanson's superb essay, "What the 
Bishops Failed to Learn from Corporate Ethics Disasters"6 which 
enunciates ten ethical principles that address the legitimate interests 
and welfare of Church stakeholders. These include: "Take care of the 
victim," "Express public apology quickly and often," "Learn everything 
about the incident; know more than anyone else." "Search for the 
causes of the crisis," "Remove individuals who are responsible." This 
essay which builds on the normative principles elaborated in the 
' Keenan , "Ethics and the Crisis in the Church," Theological Studies (2005) 66.1 117-136. 
6 Kirk Hanson, "What the Bishops failed co Learn from Corporate Ethics Disasters," Thomas 
Plance, ed., Sin Against the Innocents: Sexual Abuse by Priests and the Role of the Catholic 
.c.h.im;h (Westport: Praeger, 2004) 169-182. 
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corporate world are transposed into a Church setting and make evident 
the claim I have made here in this lecture: the need for professional 
ethical standards in the church today. Hanson's essay dealing with 
moral principles is a model of the type of literature we need to train 
church leaders for effective, moral leadership, particularly in moments 
of crisis. 
Second, my long time colleague and friend, Francine Cardman 
argues that one reason why we can not imagine the church otherwise is 
because we so easily fall into what she calls the "default mode" of 
seeing the church "as an unchanging, divinely willed institution that 
has always looked the way it does now."7 So as to think outside the 
default mode, I turn to Michael Buckley's brilliant essay in Stephen 
Pope's "A Common Calling," where he reflects on Church governance 
and states: "We are dealing with a diminishment in credibility that is 
unparalleled in the history of the church in the United States." But 
Buckley rather than going outside the Church to find resources for 
normative directions digs deep into its own rheological framework and 
from there offers four proposals that deal not with principles but rather 
long abandoned policies. Thus he begins, first we must "restore to the 
local church-and hence to the laity-a decisive voice in the selection of 
its own bishop." Second, "the church should restore the enduring 
commitment of the bishop to his see." Buckley insists that the "church 
should reaffirm strongly and effectively the ancient canonical 
prohibition that forbids a bishop's leaving one see to obtain another." 
Third, "the church needs to restore or strengthen Episcopal 
Conferences and regional gatherings oflocal bishops." Finally, "to 
counter the present excessive centralization within the church, certain 
institutions that may at one time have served a useful purpose need to 
be reconsidered and even abolished." Among his suggestions: the 
college of cardinals, the office of papal nuncio, the appointment as 
'bishops' in the Roman curia of those who have no local church they 
administer, and honorific attachments to the papal court, such as 
"monsignor." Buckley's essay on policies keeps us alert to the 
7 Francine Cardman, "Myth, History and the Beginnings of the Church," Francis Oakley and 
Bruce Russett, ed., Governance. Accouncabilic;y. and the Future of the Catholic Church (New 
York: Continuum, 2004) 33-48, at 33. 
8 
theological warrants that could make our Church leadership a more 
ethically credible institution. 8 
Finally this past year, together with Jean Bartunek and Mary 
Ann Hinsdale, I edited Church Ethics and Its Organizational Context, 
the first volume out of the Boston College Church 21 project. These 
papers resulted from a conference where theologians, sociologists, 
historians, ethicists and church leaders met with major leaders from the 
world of organizational management. The latter offered us essays on 
social drama, leadership stereotype traps, organizational scandals, 
ethical codes, intervention and corruption reform. One essay was by 
Frank Butler, the president of FAD I CA. He offered a code of ethics 
but written specifically in the context of the Church, entitled "A 
Professional Code of Ethics Reflecting the Nature of a Christian 
Vocation and an Understanding of Leadership in the Church." Let me 
read a few of his ten well-honed pledges: 
I promise to do all in my power to deepen my understanding 
of the church as a community and, as such, the body of 
Christ, and I will evaluate my service in the church daily in 
the light of my relationship to the person of Jesus Christ and 
his command to love one another as he has loved us. 
I will pledge to strengthen my understanding and practice of 
Catholicism, its teachings, principles and values on an on-
going basis so as to apply them to church operations and thus 
to be a credible witness to the faith. 
I will exercise the authority of my office in a way that 
empowers those whom I serve and work in a collaborative 
spirit of church leaders. 
I will do all in my power to foster broad participation in the 
life of the church, to encourage public opinion, and to respect 
honest differences and the rights of others.9 
8 Michael J. Buckley, "Resources for Reform from the First Millennium," Stephen Pope, ed., 
A Common Calling: The Laic;y and Governance of the Church (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004) 71-86. 
' Francis Buder, "A Professional Code of Ethics Reflecting the Nature of a Christian Vocation and 
an Understanding of Leadership in the Church," Church Ethics, 137-145. 
9 
Butler's pledges, along with Hanson's principles and Buckley's 
policies offer us a glimpse of the horizon for where our Church could 
be. 
III. The Moral Rights of Priests 
Besides principles, policies, and pledges, ethics is also 
concerned with the language of rights and responsibilities. Let me now 
turn to an initiative of my own, the rights of priests. I propose here not 
canonical rights, since I am not a canonist. Rather I use the word 
"rights" as moral theologians and Christian social ethicists do when 
speaking of the right to food, or work, or health care, that is, as a 
moral right. I propose these rights with the hope that they may be 
eventually articulated into canonical precepts. But I do not claim that 
they have canonical force today. 10 
I do not consider rights as voluntaristic assertions of power 
over and against others; rather, I see rights language as springing from a 
community of faith looking to see how best its members can protect 
the good of the whole Church and its specific members. Following 
Brian Tierney11 I believe that rights were originally recognized by 11 'h 
and 12'h century theologians and canonists who tried to articulate those 
that belonged to popes, bishops, clergy and ocher church members, not 
as inimical to the life of the Church, but as constitutive of the Church. 
In other words, way before the use of rights language appeared in the 
Enlightenment and in modern liberal democracies, they were first 
expressed as intrinsic to the good of the church. 
Rights language developed in the twelfth century precisely as 
we became more interested in the nature of the person. Caroline 
Bynum points to the privileging of spiritual experiences of members of 
charismatic movements of the twelfth century that eventually led in 
'° James F. Keenan, "Framing the Ethical Rights of Priests," Review for Religious 64.2 (2005) 
135-151; "The Ethical Rights of Priests," Touchstone, National Federation of Priests Councils 
20 (2004) 6, 19-20; 'The Moral Rights of Priests," Donald Dietrich and Michael J. Himes, ed., 
Priests for the 21st Centtu:y (New York: Crossroads, 2006) forthcoming. 
" Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church 
Law, 1150-1625 (Atlanta: Scalar's Press, 1997). 
10 
the next century to the founding of the great religious orders by 
Dominic, Francis, and Clare. In the twelfth century mystics saw 
themselves in union with God and understood God as triune, that is, 
as three persons in one God. Bynum asks the very relevant question, 
"Did the Twelfth Century Discover the lndividual?" 12 Her question is 
pivotal, inasmuch as much of the twelfth century spirituality was an 
appreciation of God's love for the human in God's image and 
inasmuch as that image was not predominantly Christological but 
Trinitarian, the Christian saw her/himself more and more like the 
Trinity, that is, as a person constitutively related to other persons. 
Rights are for persons. The more we recognize someone's 
rights the more we recognize their personhood and the more we 
recognize their personhood the more we recognize chem as related to 
ourselves. 
Rights language, therefore, does not alienate or individuate, 
divide or polarize, rather rights language incorporates into the human 
community those who are persons: upholding one's rights then is an 
act of upholding one's own participation in the goods of the 
community. 
Over the past fifty years we have seen the language of rights 
being used precisely to build up the community by asserting particular 
rights to particular groups of people. First, the civil rights movement 
which moved from asserting moral rights to articulating legal and 
constitutional ones so as to break down the predominant American 
mentality to keep African Americans segregated, that is, outside of the 
body politic. By recognizing their rights they became incorporated 
onto our buses, at our lunch counters, into our schools, and finally, 
into our neighborhoods. Second, in the pro-life movement we have 
seen a vigorous attempt to restore to fetuses the rights that Roe v. 
Wade effectively suppressed. Each gain that the fetus makes of a right 
not to be terminated or of a right toward living, each time chat we see 
a fetus being protected by the state, we see the community's growing 
12 Caroline Bynum, "Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?" Journal of Ecclesiastical 
History 31 (1980), 1-17. 
11 
recognition of the personal status of the fetus. Finally, in the gay rights 
movement, we see their search for parity about property, housing, 
healthcare, and other issues as steps toward being created more as 
persons and being more fully incorporated into the body politic. 
Thus, as Aristocle taught us, ethics is for the community and 
asserting the moral rights of priests is certainly not at the cost of the 
community, but rather for its benefit. To the extent chat these rights 
are not respected, then, to chat extent not only priests but the 
community of the church, its own very communio suffers. 
Correlatively, to the extent chat we withhold these rights to chat extent 
we exclude priests from being incorporated into the community and 
relegate to chem a second class status. 
I am convinced chat the process of recognizing, articulating, 
and asserting the rights of priests is a deeply humanizing process for a 
group of men who have suffered a great deal these years. I believe chat 
chis work of rights helps restore to priests not only their incorporation 
into the community, but also occasions the possible restoration of 
much of their humanity that has been disregarded. 
Moreover, I believe chat if we can articulate and defend the 
rights of the clergy we will with chat mentality articulate and defend 
the rights of the laity. In fact, the laity are already doing that and one 
reason why I am speaking about the rights of the clergy is precisely 
because so few do. 
The six rights chat I am proposing are not unrelated to one 
another; taken together they more fully comprehend the man in his 
humanity and in his priesthood. Though the Code of Canon Law 
defines three canonical rights for priests: of association, to a vacation, 
and to fitting and decent remuneration. Instead of these three 
canonical rights, I propose six "moral" ones: the right to share in the 
Episcopal ministry of the local ordinary; the right of association; the 
right to discern the proper exercise of our ministry; the right to our 
personal development; the right to privacy; and, the right to fair 
treatment. Let me briefly comment on each of chem. 
12 
The right to share in the Episcopal ministry of the local ordinary 
The first right echoes one chat had been discussed in the 
revision of the code of canon law, "the right of cooperating with the 
bishop in the exercise of his ministry." le is derived from three Vatican 
II documents. The Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests writes: 
"Priescly obedience, inspired through and through by the spirit of 
cooperation, is based on the sharing of the Episcopal ministry which is 
conferred by the sacrament of order and the canonical mission." 13 
Similarly, in The Bishops' Pastoral Office, we find: "All priests, whether 
diocesan or religious, share and exercise with the bishop the one 
priesthood of Christ." 14 Finally, Lumen Gentium declares: "The Bishop 
is to regard his priests, who are his co-workers, as sons and friends, just 
as Christ called his disciples no longer servants but friends." 15 
le is also found in the rice of ordination. The first question the 
bishop asks the ordinand is: 
"Are you resolved, with the help of the Holy Spirit, to 
discharge without fail the office of priesthood in the presbyteral order 
as a conscientious fellow worker with the bishops in caring for the 
Lord's flock?" 
Then, in the prayer of consecration we hear the bishop say: 
"Lord, grant also to us such fellow workers, 
for we are weak and our need is greater. 
Almighty Father, grant to this servant 
of yours the dignity of the priesthood. 
Renew within him the Spirit of holiness. 
As a co-worker with the order of bishops 
may he be faithful to the ministry 
that he receives from you, Lord God, 
and be to ochers a model of right conducc." 16 
13 Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests (Presbyterorum Ordinis), 7. 
" The Bishops' Pasroral Office (Christus Dominus), 28. 
" Lumen Gentium 28. 
16 ln this section I am indebted ro, John Lynch, 'The Obligations and Rights of Clerics," John 
Beal, James Corriden, and Thomas Green, ed., The New Commentary on the Code of Canon 
Law (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2000) 343-381. 
13 
The right of association 
The right of sharing in the ministry of the bishop leads to 
fostering right relations among the clergy through association. Canon 
275.1 states, "Since clerics all work for the same purpose, namely, the 
building up of the Body of Christ, they are to be united among 
themselves by a bond of brotherhood and prayer and strive for 
cooperation among themselves according to the prescripts of particular 
law." Immediately after this paragraph, the Code adds, "Clerics are to 
acknowledge and promote the mission, which the lairy, each for his or 
her part, exercises in the Church and in the world." Associations 
among the clergy are intimately tied, then, to promoting the laity's 
own involvement in the life of the church. In fact, in the earlier draft 
of the Code, the clergy were only called to recognize the laity's mission; 
according to the promulgated code, they must promote it. 
Though canon 215 defined the right of all the Christian 
Faithful to form associations, that is, both lay and clergy, canon 278 
establishes it as the first canonical right for priests. The Code reads: 
"Secular clerics have the right to associate with others to pursue 
purposes in keeping with the clerical state." This is the first time that 
canon law recognized this moral right. 
In developing the revised code, the commission rejected a 
proposal that placed associations of priests under the local ordinary. To 
do so would be to infringe on the exercise of the very right that was 
being promulgated. 
Throughout the United States, we have seen in the past few 
years free standing priests' associations emerge, for example, The 
Boston Priests Forum, The Milwaukee Archdiocese Priest Alliance, or 
New York's Voice of the Ordained. This moral right validates these 
groups. The recent innovations by priests to form local groups are 
congruent with good thinking within the church. Moreover, these 
organizations do not replace presbyteral councils but represent a few of 
what Pope John XXIII referred to as the "wide varieties" of gatherings 
necessary for human flourishment. 
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The right to discern the proper exercise of our ministry 
While there is an obligation to exercise one's priestly ministry, 
there is also a right to exercise that ministry according to one's 
particular judgment. Here I think of pastors who must discern a 
variety of issues on a weekly basis: whether this particular couple is 
actually ready to get married in the Church, whether they should 
preach about the way the Gospel applies to this particular local issue, 
or how these children in this parish should be prepared for 
confirmation. 
In the USCCB document on Sunday homilies Fulfilled in 
Your Hearing, we find the bishops calling the pastor to listen to the 
Scriptures and to the Congregation and to respond to that listening. Is 
there something that happens existentially in that listening that could 
prompt the pastor to hear the needs of the lairy of his parish in some 
way that the bishop has not yet addressed? If the priest, in all his 
listening is also obliged "to foster peace and harmony based on justice" 
as canon 287 states, he may find himself needing to obey his 
conscience as a preacher of the Word to the particular congregation he 
serves. 
This is not advocacy for rebel priests. Rather it recognizes both 
the context in which a priest exercises his ministry and the process by 
which he comes to preach the sermon and exercise other forms of 
ministry. Though by his faculties a priest exercises his ministry at the 
bishop's pleasure, there seems to be another claim on the priest that 
comes not from the bishop directly but from the people whom the 
priest serves. If the priest is to truly promote peace and justice and 
communio, it seems that in order to discern how to do so, he needs to 
rely on something in addition to the bishops' particular perspective. 
Like other expressions of his ministry that he shares with the bishop 
and with the lairy, a priest's preaching calls for a conscientious integrity 
to witness to the Gospel as he sees it expressed in his midst. This too 
follows from the insight of Thomas Aquinas that as we descend into a 
situation specific circumstances need to be attended to in order to 
rightly discern what is actually required. 
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Putting the right of the bishop to teach and the right of the 
priest to discern the proper exercise of his ministry in tandem with one 
another is very important for together they achieve a balance. 
The right to our own personal development 
While the previous right affirms the relevance of a priest's 
personal, though professional experience with his congregation and 
encourages him to trust the development of a professional fealty with 
his parishioners that couples the fealty he enjoys with his ordinary 
through the orders which unite them, this right encourages the 
community and the priest to appreciate the priest as an embodied, 
personal relational agent. In many ways it expresses the insight chat the 
priest must learn not only about his parish and his chancery, but also 
about himself. If the previous right is about him developing himself 
into a professional, chis right recognizes that to be a professional one 
needs to be a person first. 
Because of clericalism, most priests' personal affective 
experiences are measured not with mature adult self-understanding and 
responsible affective conduct based on mutual respect, but rather on an 
intuited sense of what constituted "proper discretion." In other words, 
so long as a priest manifested decorum, he stayed within the boundary 
lines of acceptable clerical conduct. 17 
By this right, however, we see that affective experiences are 
good and necessary for personal growth and wisdom; chis right 
recognizes what clericalism shadows. It proposes to say chat priests 
need and have a right to the forms of friendship and responsible 
affective relations chat make a person a mature adult and that he has a 
right to invoke these experiences as sources of wisdom. 
The range of the right is broader than simply the development 
of affective relationships, since it includes intellectual and spiritual 
development as well. Thus, priests have a right to continuing 
17 Michael Papesh, "Farewell to the Club," America 186 (May 13, 2002) 8-9; see also his Clerical 
Culture: Contradiction and Transformation (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2004). See also, Gibson, 
"Clericalism: The Original Sin," in The Coming Catholic Church 197-219. 
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education, leisure, sabbaticals, retreats, adequate time for daily prayer, 
etc. In other words, priests have duties in these areas and thereby 
should have rights as well. A more inclusive right to human 
development embraces affective experience (intimacy, friendship, etc.) 
while also calling for needed intellectual and spiritual development and 
their related goods as well. 18 
Rightly understood, these spiritual and intellectual 
developments happen within an affective context. Thus, the right 
could be expressed as I heard it from a fellow priest and friend: the 
right to our own affective experience and the wisdom that derives from 
it. Bernard of Clairvaux supports the claim, "lnstructio doctos reddit, 
affectio sapientes." 19 Instruction renders us learned, experience renders 
us wise. In my own life as a priest, I have received much wisdom about 
myself, my God, those I serve and my share as a disciple in the mission 
of Christ as a man precisely through the affective relationships that 
challenged, sustained and nurtured me. 
The right to privacy 
This right turns inevitably to the right to privacy. Recently, the 
noted Roman moral theologian Brian Johnstone proposed privacy as 
the protected zone wherein a person can exercise self-determination, 
pursuing ends in a shared moral climate wherein the individual and 
society respect the claims of one another, that is the individual's 
"See Pope Paul VI, "Progressio Populorum." 
19 "Nee re moveac, quod inirium sapienriae huic demum loco dederim, er non priori. !bi quippe in 
quodam quasi auditorio suo docenrem de omnibus magisrram audimus Sapienriam, hie et 
suscipimus; ibi insrruimur quidem, sed hie afficimur. lnscruccio doctos reddir, affecrio sapienres. 
Sol non omnes, quibus lucet, eriam calefacir; sic Sapienria multos, quos docer quid sir 
faciendum, non conrinuo eriam accendir ad faciendum. Aliud est mulras divirias scire, aliud et 
possidere; nee nociria divirem facir, sed possessio. Sic prorsus, sic aliud est nosse Deum, et aliud 
rimere; nee cognirio sapientem, sed rimor facir, qui et afficic. Tune sapienrem dixeris, quern sua 
scienria inflar? Quis illos sapienres nisi insipienrissimus dicac, qui cum cognovissenr Deum, non 
canquam Deum glorificaverunr, auc gratias egerunr? Ego magis cum Apostolo senrio, qui 
insipiens cor eorum manifesre pronunriar (Rom. I, 21). Er bene inirium sapienriae timor 
Domini; quia rune primum Deus animae sapir, cum earn afficir ad rimendum, non cum inscruic 
ad sciendum. Times Dei jusririam, rimes potenriam; er sapir ribi jusrus et porens Deus, quia 
rimor sapor est. Porro sapor sapienrem facir, sicur scienria scienrem, sicuc diviriae divitem." 
(Bernardus Claraevallensis. Sermones in Canrica Canricorum. Sermo 23, 14. En: Migne. PL 
183, cols. 089ld-0892a). 
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personal good and society's common good.20 
The right to privacy is the right to exercise personal 
responsibilities and decisions. It is the right to be self-determinative, 
the right to be a mature adult whose movements are not subject to 
suspicion or intrusion without civil warrant. The right protects a 
person to be a person. In short, it allows a priest to have a place he 
calls his home, a circle of acquaintances to be called friends, and a 
conversation to be called confidential. 
The assertion of the right to privacy not only shoulders the 
earlier rights stated above, but it also prompts us to recognize the 
relevance of the final right. 
The right to fair treatment 
This right arises in the light of the National Review Board's 
endorsement of zero tolerance. Here let me simply note that fairness 
cuts two ways. Not only ought due proportionality emerge somehow 
in the treatment of accused and offending priests, but priests alone 
cannot and should not bear the weight of the scandal. If a zero 
tolerance policy is applied to priests, where is an analogous policy for 
the scandalous bishops? 
The scandal will only come to rest when justice has been 
served, but an inequitable justice is not justice. The National Review 
Board has then two additional more responsibilities: they must 
somehow guarantee that due process and due proportionality are 
granted to priests and they must hold proportionally accountable both 
the offending priests and the offending bishops. 
No less than Cardinal Avery Dulles has addressed the rights of 
priests to due process.21 As we attempt to discern the rights of priests it 
is this right more than any other that demands that a priest accused 
deserves to be treated as a human being, that is, as a person. 
'° Brian Johnstone, "The Right to Privacy: The Ethical Perspective," The American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 29 (1984) 73-94; Richard McCormick, "The Moral Right to Privacy," in How 
Brave a New World (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981) 352-61. 
" Avery Cardinal Dulles, "The Rights of Accused Priests: Toward a Revision of the Dallas Charter 
and the 'Essential Norms'," America (190.20) June 21, 2004. 
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I propose these six rights-one about participatory leadership, 
another about right to associate, a third about ministerial vocation, the 
fourth about personal growth, the fifth about basic civil liberties, and 
the sixth about fairness-with the hope that these may further 
encourage the voice of the clergy. 
Throughout these recent years, the voice of the clergy, when it 
does occasionally, though not at all often enough, address either the 
harm and shame attached to the abuse of children or the rights of the 
laity and bishops, has done so most frequently in the place that they 
are called to be: the parish pulpit. I suggest that if priests begin to 
recognize the rights due them-especially at a time when many find 
themselves, as the Report by the National Review Board states, 
demoralized-they might in turn be more vocal from that pulpit in 
recognizing the rights of others and in fostering the communio that 
the Church so desperately needs. 
Iv. A Strategic Conclusion 
I have learned from an old friend and good mentor, John 
O'Malley that in the pursuit of any reform we cannot simply rely on 
one mode of proceeding. In his book, The Four Cultures of the West, 
O'Malley differentiates the world of the academic paper, the rhetorical 
sermon or speech, the prophetic action and the poetic meditation.22 
These are not simply cultures, as O'Malley proposes them, but also the 
very strata of strategies of reform. We academicians need to do our 
work and to publish our papers, but if we want to see our proposals 
ever embraced we will need to combine our efforts with the preachers, 
the prophets and the poets. We need not stand alone and in fact we 
cannot, but perhaps in a university like Santa Clara, where each of 
these cultures are welcomed we can see them advancing with the rest of 
us the strategies of reform by which we all get into the habit of 
thinking, whenever we wish to move ahead, whether in the church or 
in the academy, that lingering question that must be more habitually 
asked, "but is it ethical?" 
22 John O'Malley, Four Cultures of the West (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 2004). 
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